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ARTICLE
SOVEREIGN DEBTORS IN DISTRESS
DAVID EHMKE*
I. THE PATH TOWARDS A SOLID DESIGN FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT LENDING
“The price for these quasi-bailouts is tremendous.”1 In 2012, Christian
Kirchner and I published a proposal for how to resolve the situation of
financial distress for sovereign debtors. We concluded that the quasi-
bailouts practiced in the European Monetary Union (EMU) have erroneous
consequences for a successful monetary union and that state intervention as
it has been practiced in the euro crisis creates more harm than good. The
topic of sovereign distress is still hot. In this paper, I will follow the path
towards a market-approach in sovereign debt restructuring that the late
Christian Kirchner, in whose honor I have presented this paper at the St.
Thomas Christian Kirchner Memorial Symposium, had shown in our joint-
article on sovereign debt restructuring. Different crisis resolution mecha-
nisms will be discussed,2 but most importantly the ex ante reflections of ex
post outcomes will be analyzed. The “Greek tragedy” and the “Argentina
default poker” will be analyzed as vivid examples for prominently practiced
reactions to sovereign debt distress.
The goal of this paper is to identify and analyze the challenges that
creditors and sovereign debtors face in their lending relations, considering
* David Christoph Ehmke, M.Sc. (Oxford), PhD-Candidate, conducting research on corpo-
rate bond debt restructuring in the U.K., U.S., and Germany at the Humboldt-University of Berlin
under the supervision of Professor Dr. Christoph Paulus, contact: david.ehmke@web.de. It is
based on a presentation at the Christian Kirchner Memorial Symposium in Minneapolis in 2014.
My first publication on the issue of sovereign debt restructuring in the Oxford University Compar-
ative Law Forum was in joint authorship with the late Professor Dr. Christian Kirchner. I had the
great chance to get to know Christian Kirchner as an inspiring teacher while working as a research
assistant to him from 2011 to 2013. I am very thankful to Professor Dr. Charles Blankart, Joel
Fischer, the participants of the Christian Kirchner Memorial Symposium, and the editors of the
University of St. Thomas Law Journal for valuable comments on my presentation and earlier draft
versions of this paper. All remaining errors are mine.
1. Christian Kirchner & David Ehmke, Private Ordering in Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
Reforming the London Club, OXFORD U. COMP. L. F., http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/kirchner
_ehmke.shtml (last visited Aug. 14, 2015).
2. For an overview of concepts for sovereign debt restructuring see Kenneth Rogoff & Jer-
omin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/02/133, 2002).
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the ex ante and ex post perspective (i.e., the situation of financial and/or
economic distress and the ex ante reflections of the anticipated ex post situ-
ation). The reputational and signaling effect of how sovereign debt crises
are resolved, or could be resolved under a collective restructuring procedure
along with their factual consequences in ex ante reflections of anticipated ex
post outcomes, will be of particular interest. Two entirely different types of
sovereign debtors in distress will be distinguished: (1) the sovereign debtor
“on its own”—the Argentina case,3 and (2) sovereign debtors in a transfer
union—the Greek case.4
It will be shown:
First, a sovereign debtor can be held legally responsible for its debt
obligations. Nonetheless, enforcement against a sovereign that hides behind
its national borders is a challenging undertaking. The role of creditors that
hold out and attempt to enforce debt obligations may be seen as two-faced.
Most scholarship is concerned with the question of how opportunistic be-
havior of creditors can be prevented in the interest of creditors and the
debtor once the sovereign is factually insolvent.5 From this perspective,
holdouts appear to be the troublemakers. However, as long as the sovereign
debtor does not credibly commit to a restructuring regime and “rules by
action” (i.e., unilaterally stops complying with its legal obligations or re-
sorts to coercive strategies), holdouts sanction the sovereign debtor for its
misconduct. From an ex ante perspective, the threat of holdouts’ actions has
an important disciplinary function.6
Second, a broken debt promise affects the debtor’s reputation as a fu-
ture debtor. Expectations about ex post outcomes are reflected ex ante in the
debtor’s options for debt acquisition and the cost of debt capital.7
Third, the credibility of a national lawmaker can be inferred from its
behavior as a debtor. Lost confidence in the “rule of law” and the promise
of legal certainty are barriers for foreign investments into local businesses
that suffer from their home countries’ misbehavior as debtors. The costs
ultimately fall back on the national economy.8
3. See infra Section III.C.2.
4. See infra Section III.C.1.
5. For a comparative discussion of the hold-out and free-rider strategy in sovereign debt
negotiations, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51
EMORY L. J. 1317 (2002); Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Ignacio Tirado, The Problem of
Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings (Jan. 22, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205704. See also Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, Hold-
outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environ-
ment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16632, 2010) (discussing
comparatively the hold-out and free-rider strategy in sovereign debt negotiations). See infra Sec-
tion IV for discussion regarding proposals for sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms, which
deal explicitly with inter-creditor problems.
6. See infra Sections III.A.4, III.B.1, III.B.4.
7. See infra Section III.B.4.
8. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
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Fourth, although there are decisive differences between a sovereign
debtor and a private debtor, a collective procedure is still the best way to
secure an ex ante and ex post efficient solution.9
Fifth, a debt-restructuring mechanism not only functions to regulate
creditor-creditor problems of collective action and opportunistic actions, but
also to exert a disciplinary effect on the debtor. What is true for private
debtors is also true for sovereign debtors. In the long run, the sovereign will
profit from the signaling effect of its credible commitment. The existence of
a cooperative debt-restructuring mechanism reveals dubious exit strategies
of unilateral actions. If a sovereign government faces a high risk to be un-
masked as fraudulent debtors, opportunistic and short-sighted political ac-
tions will become less likely.10
Sixth, the costs of a bailout are tremendous. Bailing out an economi-
cally distressed debtor destroys the link between risks and returns, punishes
the good and rewards the unreliable debtors in a transfer union. If the inter-
est rates of the transfer union member states converge, interest rates will
lose their disciplinary function. Money is cheap for economically and finan-
cially weak debtors. A pooling equilibrium destroys the incentive for an
individually solid budget.11
Eventually, a predictable sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM) in public or private ordering is the keystone that stabilizes the
international financial architecture—in the interest of both sovereign debt-
ors and creditors.
II. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A. Methodological Approach
The focus of this paper will be consequentialist. Creditors care about
the risk-return rate of their investment (positive question). The possible re-
actions to distress are important because they determine not only the credi-
tors’ return in distress, but are crucial for the probability (the incremental
risk) that distress occurs. Creditors adjust their price expectations to the
probability of distress occurring and their return in distress.
The political agents of the sovereign debtors can be expected to orient
themselves to their fate in distress; they may be rescued in a bailout or be
subject to a collective procedure to which they have bound themselves, and
so forth. Debtors consider their reputation in lending relations for debt capi-
tal raising (i.e., the cost of debt capital and the opportunities for its acquisi-
tion). Furthermore, they are interested in attracting foreign investments into
their local economy. Contagious effects of the debtor’s previous misbehav-
ior in lending relations on their reputation as a “host country” for invest-
9. See infra Section IV.A.
10. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.3, IV.A, IV.B, IV.C.
11. See infra Sections III.A.3, III.B.1, III.B.3.
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ments into local businesses have to be accounted for. Since all parties are
concerned with the factual consequences of their credit relations, the meth-
odological approach cannot be purely legal, but must be consequentialist;
that is, it must be a law and economics methodology.
The toolkit for analysis that shall be applied to questions addressed in
this paper will be based on the methodological approach of the New Institu-
tional Economics (NIE).12 The laureate Christian Kirchner contributed sig-
nificantly to the development of the consequentialist method. He was a
pioneer in the introduction of NIE methodology in Germany.13 NIE focuses
on the rules of the game. The question is how does the institutional setting
affect the actions of individual players. The framework conditions are the
scarcity of resources and existence of transaction costs,14 as well as incom-
plete and asymmetrically allocated information. It is assumed that the indi-
vidual players act with bounded rationality15 and are self-interested towards
their own goal. It is further assumed that they neglect harm to other players
if that serves their own aims (opportunism).16 In order to guarantee a suc-
cessful game that benefits all players, institutions should be designed in a
way that avoids inefficient results and lets the players approach a win-win
situation. Institutions are defined as rules fortified by an enforcement mech-
anism.17 The effectiveness of the institution depends on the credible en-
forcement of a positive sanction (a carrot) as a reward for compliance, or a
negative sanction (a stick) as a punishment for non-compliance.
B. Private and Public Ordering
The distinction between private and public ordering is an important
starting point for analysis within a national law context, since they both
have their inherent qualities. While private ordering encompasses any kind
of agreement between legally equal parties that are bound by rules made by
themselves (self-binding regulation), public ordering comprises regulation
imposed by an external body top-down (i.e., the democratic or dictatorial
12. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985);
DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990);
Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL
ECON. 229 (1984).
13. See, e.g., Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Christian Kirchner & Erich Schanze, ¨Okonomische An-
alyse des Rechts (UTB 1993); Christian Kirchner, The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics
in Germany, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 277, 277–79 (1991).
14. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 16 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
15. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL – MATHEMATICAL
ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IN SOCIAL SETTINGS (1957); Herbert A. Simon, A Be-
havioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 THE Q. J. OF ECON. 99, 101–02 (1955).
16. Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and its Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION
ECON. 97, 98 (1993).
17. EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS & ECONOMIC THEORY 6–7 (2d
ed. 2005).
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state).18 The relation between private and public ordering is reciprocal. De-
cision-makers within each regulatory system adjust to developments in both
systems. One regulatory system may be used to complement or to factually
suspend and circumvent the other system. Thereby, private ordering allows
for a higher degree of flexibility and adjustability to the individual case and
is distinguished by a learning advantage, in contrast to public ordering deci-
sion-making, which is relatively ponderous. However, public ordering is
broader-ranging, as it also binds those individuals who have not previously
and expressly agreed to be bound, and can contribute to a reduction in
transaction costs.19
In the context of sovereign debt relations and debt restructuring, the
distinction is not as clear-cut. A public debt restructuring procedure for sov-
ereigns with an “unsustainable debt” burden does not exist.20 Private order-
ing exists in the form of loan/bond contracts, restructuring negotiations pre-
determined in loan/bond contracts, and ad hoc private agreements.21 A dis-
tortion in the case of private ordering is that although the sovereign has
entered the stage of commercial contracting (acta iure gestionis), meaning
the sovereign cannot claim state immunity from foreign judgments for its
commercial activities,22 some sovereigns have—once troubled—treated the
rules they allegedly subjected themselves to with contempt, and unilaterally
declared they would pay less than they were obliged to.
Since enforcement against a sovereign is still a daunting task, the lend-
ing game involves a lot of hurdles. The case of public ordering in the con-
text of sovereign debt is even more awkward. Even though it is theoretically
possible to enforce repayment against a sovereign debtor, enforcement fac-
tually stops at the sovereign debtor’s boarders.23 The larger share of the
sovereign’s assets is generally not available for distribution to the creditors.
The dogma that sovereigns cannot be liquidated shall not be questioned in
this paper. However, one has to note that the absence of this option removes
a threat that would be available in corporate debt lending, and this impacts
the behavior of the debtor’s political agents who maintain strong bargaining
18. Christian Kirchner & David Ehmke, Recht und Staat in HANDBUCH TRANSFORMATION-
SFORSCHUN 455 (Raj Kollmorgen, Wolfgang Merkel & Hans-Ju¨rgen Wagener eds., 2015).
19. See Christian Kirchner, Evolution of Law: Interplay between Private and Public Rule-
Making – A New Institutional Economics-Analysis, 4 ERASMUS L. REV. 161 (2011); Kirchner &
Ehmke, supra note 18.
20. The term “unsustainable debt” has been suggested by the IMF, and points to the chal-
lenging undertaking to define the “point of no return” for a sovereign debtor when a debt restruc-
turing becomes necessary/recommendable. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL
REPORT 2008: MAKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY WORK FOR ALL 54 (2008).
21. For a critique of ad hoc private agreement in context of bailout expectations, see Barry
Eichengreen & Christof Ru¨hl, The Bail-in Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means, 25 ECON.
SYS. 3 (2001).
22. See generally Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891; State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, (U.K.).
23. See infra Section III.A.4.
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positions in relation to the sovereign’s creditors.24 Creditors claiming the
repayment of the debt owed to them have to resort to other strategies that
seek to punish the sovereign debtor for non-compliance with its debt prom-
ise and incentivize the sovereign to fulfill its obligations.25
III. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
A. The Ex Post Perspective: Sovereign Debtors in Financial and/or
Economic Distress
1. Preliminary Considerations
Creditors and debtors adjust their actions based on their expectations
about the probability of distress and its consequences. Players on the side of
creditors and debtors invest more or less effort in monitoring and control
mechanisms aimed at reducing the risk of an unsustainable debt burden (or
may even facilitate a default) depending on what the individual players as-
sume their individual harm or benefit to be in the anticipated case.26 If a
cloudy body of creditors makes effective monitoring and control less likely,
the increased risk will be priced into the cost of debt capital. If an opaque
situation for debt restructuring or a dilemma situation diminishes the chance
of an efficient outcome, the risk will be, again, accounted for by the disad-
vantage of the debtor ex ante. Since all players orient their actions ex ante
to their expectations about the situation of distress and its consequences, it
appears appropriate to begin with the ex post perspective on financial and/or
economic distress before analyzing the ex ante reflections.
2. A Cloudy Body of Creditors
Publicly offered and traded debt has become a major source of sover-
eign debt capital acquisition and has widely replaced commercial bank
loans for private creditors since the debt crisis in Latin America.27 This has
important implications. Debtors benefit from the opportunity to attract vari-
ous creditors that can more easily diversify their portfolio and flexibly trade
their claims on secondary markets.28 The bond covenants can be assumed to
be less strict, giving the sovereign debtor more room to maneuver than with
bank loan covenants. Moreover, debt capital acquisitions on capital markets
24. See infra Section III.A.4.
25. See infra Section III.A.4.
26. For a discussion on ex ante calculations of creditors in corporate bond investments see
David Christoph Ehmke, Publicly Offered Debt in the Shadow of Insolvency, 16 EUROPEAN BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 63 (2015).
27. See John Clark, Debt Reduction and Market Reentry under the Brady Plan, FRBNY
QUARTERLY REV. WINTER 38, 44–45 (1993); Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the
Secondary Market and its Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701,
2715–23 (1996).
28. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards? The Role of Litigation in
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L. J. 1043, 1070–73 (2004).
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can make the sovereign less dependent on political obligations that may be
(directly or indirectly) attached to bilateral debt.
The other side of the coin is that private creditors are, first and fore-
most, focused on their return, and thus may be less lenient than public cred-
itors to forgive debt. Bond creditors are also less likely to have further-
reaching business relations with the debtor, as compared to bank creditors
that may be willing to forgive debt in order to strengthen their business
relations with the debtor. Most importantly, this development has led to a
cloudy body of creditors that is entirely fragmented, anonymous, and stead-
ily changing.29 Information and coordination problems (collective action
problems) arise, creditors are caught in prisoner’s dilemma situations, and
the risk of opportunistic actions by creditors and the sovereign debtor hid-
den in the shadows of an opaque and disorderly situation are exacerbated.30
While the Paris Club for sovereign creditors and the London Club for
private creditors, as informal institutions, have proven to facilitate debt re-
structuring negotiations,31 a shift towards debt capital acquisition by pub-
licly offered and traded bonds requires new solutions. A changing structure
of the body of creditors makes a bargaining solution in spontaneous order-
ing (i.e., neither pre-determined by bond terms nor in a public procedure)
unlikely to succeed.
The more the body of creditors is fragmented and anonymous, the
higher the costs are for information and coordination once restructuring be-
comes necessary, and creditors have to be identified, negotiations have to
take place, and a vote on a restructuring plan has to be organized. In the
time of syndicated bank lending, a relatively homogeneous group of private
creditors with regular inter-creditor relations could exert peer pressure on
non-cooperating creditors in order to promote an agreement.32 It is a com-
mon phenomenon in restructuring negotiations that although a solution ap-
pears to be pareto-efficient, some players gamble on a higher individual
outcome, neglecting harm to other players—they might do so because they
are captured in a prisoners’ dilemma situation.33 They can hold out and try
to delay negotiations, individually enforce their claim, or threaten the sover-
eign and its creditors with (long-term) negative consequences. The Argen-
tina case presented in Section III.C gives an illustrative example for the
29. Id. at 1074–79.
30. See infra Section IV for private and public ordering answers that were developed in
response to the mentioned problems.
31. For example, the London Club has functioned as a forum for debt restructuring negotia-
tions between sovereign debtors and (syndicated) bank lenders in Latin America (1980s) and
Eastern Europe (1990s). On the work of the Paris and the London Club see Richard P.C. Brown &
Timothy J. Bulman, The Evolving Role of the Clubs in the Management of International Debt, 33
INT’L J. OF SOC. ECON. 11 (2006).
32. Power, supra note 27, at 2709–14.
33. On the buoying-up effect in corporate insolvency, see Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibi-
tion in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L. J. 232, 236–39 (1987).
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strategic games played by sovereign debtors and holdout creditors. Propos-
als for a comprehensive collective restructuring procedure designed to an-
swer the challenges of a cloudy body of creditors will be presented in
Section IV.
3. The Bailout
A default can be avoided by a bailout from a third party. The recent
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone was “solved” through a bailout.34 A
bailout of an economically healthy but financially troubled sovereign can be
justified by the chance to avoid the (indirect) cost of factual insolvency
through the injection of liquidity. The prevention of contagious effects for
the local economy and creditors, which may be troubled with their debtor’s
default, is another valid argument. Moreover, the crisis should be prevented
from spreading to other countries. It is argued that if the sovereign defaults,
its creditors will follow, and if such institutional creditors are system-rele-
vant, they will have to be rescued by their national government with mas-
sive liquidity input.35 This in turn can cause the rescuing sovereign to totter.
The bailout should initially stop a knock-out effect.
In the case of an economically distressed country, a bailout entails the
risk of curing the symptom instead of the problem itself. A bailout can
weaken or destroy the link between risk and return and promote moral haz-
ard.36 In order to establish (or re-establish) the link between risk and con-
trol, a high level of institutional congruency has to be secured. The party
bearing the risk and taking the responsibility in the case of distress has the
strongest incentive to work toward a solid budgetary policy, and therefore
should be in control in order to approach efficiency and to avoid opportu-
nism.37 Eventually, a bailout with conditions of subsequent political change
will have the disadvantage of being reactive instead of preventive. A collec-
tive restructuring mechanism with a strict no-bailout principle instead con-
34. For a critical analysis of the bailout strategy, see Charles B. Blankart, Macht der Euro
su¨chtig? 84 (31) FINANZ UND WIRTSCHAFT 1 (2011); Charles Blankart, Goldgra¨ber
bedrohen Euroland in DIE ZUKUNFT DER W ¨AHRUNGSUNION, CHANCEN UND RISIKEN DES EURO
291 (Dirk Mayer ed., 2012); Otmar Issing, Moral Hazard will Result from ECB Bond Buying,
FINANCIAL TIMES Nov. 30, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/41640740-1a7a-11e1-ae4e00144
feabdc0.html#axzz3TG9dLFrk.
35. For information on misleading incentives of the too-big-to-fail question, see Alan D.
Morrison, Systemic Risks and the ‘Too-Big-to-Fail’ Problem, 27 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POLICY
498 (2011).
36. Charles B. Blankart & David Ehmke, Are Euro and Transfer Union the Price of German
Reunification?, in FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER 665, 670–75 (Wulf A. Kaal,
Matthias Schmidt & Andreas Schwartze eds., 2014). The ex ante costs of the bailout are further
outlined in Section III.B.3.
37. Charles B. Blankart & David Christoph Ehmke, Kostenkontrolle im Fo¨deralismus, 63
ZEITSCHRIFT FUER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK 173 (2014); Charles Blankart & David Ehmke, Collective
Decisions on Public Debt, work in progress presented at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Euro-
pean Public Choice Society in Groningen [hereinafter Blankart & Ehmke (work in progress)].
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firms the link between risk and return. In case of budgetary autonomy and
an institutionally coherent no-bailout-principle, credit markets perform a
control function for the debtor’s budgetary policy with the interest rate as a
measure of the debtor’s budgetary performance.
4. A Broken Promise: The Case of Unilateral Cessation of
Payments
The goal of this paper is not to answer what is right or wrong, just or
unjust, but to draw key conclusions for a positive economic analysis. In this
light, the case of unilateral cessation of payments to holdout creditors after
an exchange offer is two-faced. There is one story that is well-known, quite
often told by the political agents of sovereign debtors in default, and by
people with “good intentions” concerned about the troubled sovereign’s cit-
izens’ benefit. The moral of that story is simple: a sovereign seeks relief
from an “unsustainable” debt burden. The sovereign’s citizens struggle and
long for a second chance, a fresh start. The sovereign’s government plays
fair and is thus seen to be in the best position to assess and decide on the
appropriate haircut. Those who do not accept the sovereign’s offer to ex-
change are greedy investors. However, the most evil villains enter the game
when the sovereign is in severe distress. They buy original claims and at-
tempt to enforce repayment against the sovereign through litigation and de-
vious enforcement strategies. Such “vulture funds” speculate on excessive
profits.
There exists another less prominent version of that story—a debtor
breaks its promise to repay its loan. The debtor rejects fulfilling its legal
duty and threatens its creditors: “Take what I am willing to pay or you will
get nothing!” Most creditors accept, but some resist the reckless “black-
mail.”38 Since they are individually too weak to enforce their legal rights
against the sovereign debtor that hides behind its national borders, they
trade their claims to a specialized creditor fund that takes the burden of risk.
All around the world the fund tries to uphold the betrayed creditors’ rights
and restore the “rule of law” with only the distant chance that its efforts will
succeed.39 In the rare case that the “white knight fund” can enforce the debt
promise against a sovereign, the fund will be honored with a capital
treasure.
The truth lies between both stories. First, there are situations when a
debt restructuring is inevitable. Second, it is hard to measure when a debt
burden is “unsustainable” and how high a proper haircut would be. What is
38. See generally Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implica-
tions of Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 311 (2005) (emphasizing the risk for sovereign
debt lending that comes from opportunistic behavior of sovereign debtors).
39. For an overview of litigation against sovereign debtors that defaulted on their obligation
see Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation:
Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2010).
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required is a complex assessment of the national economy. There is no
threat of liquidation, and the potential for taxation and savings is not only
determined by the economy but also by political factors. Third, this process,
in absence of a public sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, is disorderly
if no collective action clauses allow for a majority decision binding a non-
cooperating minority. The unilateral cessation of payments is clearly illegal.
Fourth, funds that specialize in litigation and enforcement against a sover-
eign gamble on high returns when they buy bonds with a sharp discount on
the secondary market; but they assume a high risk at the same time, and it is
the rational choice for creditors to concentrate on outstanding bonds in or-
der to profit from synergies in litigation and enforcement costs and the ex-
pertise of the so-called “vulture funds.” Certainly, their strategy is self-
interested if not opportunistic. However, calling them “white knight funds”
casts light on another function they perform even though this might not be
their actual goal—a sovereign, who can shield itself against lawful enforce-
ment behind national borders, has a strong bargaining position that the sov-
ereign’s political agents can exploit. The threat that a creditor fund can win
a title against a sovereign, and if not enforce but at least block the sover-
eign’s access to the international capital markets and cause serious harm to
the sovereign, is a deterrent and constant reminder for sovereigns to play
fair.40 Finally, those who call for debt relief and a debtor-friendly exit from
unsustainable indebtedness—in particular for developing countries—may
have good intentions.41 However, such proposals factually implemented are
likely to cause more harm than good, considering the ex ante cost in debt
capital lending, with serious spill-over effects to the reputational damage to
sovereign debtors.42
40. The question of “vultures or vanguards” and the role of holdouts along theses lines is
discussed by Fisch & Gentile, supra note 28.
41. See generally Kunibert Raffer, Sovereign Debt Workout Arrangements, in AFTER NE-
OLIBERALISM: ECONOMIC POLICIES THAT WORK FOR THE POOR 88 (Jim Weaver, Didier Jacobs &
Jamie Baker eds., 2002) (claiming the ideas of the United States Treasury with Chapter 9 based
insolvency); Ann Pettifor, Resolving International Debt Crises Fairly, 17 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 2
(2003) (presenting the case for institutional reforms that can better protect the human rights of
citizens of sovereign debtor nations during debt crises); Kunibert Raffer, Let Countries Go Bank-
rupt The Case for Fair and Transparent Debt Arbitration, 4 INT’L POL. AND SOC’Y 367 (2001)
(stating that Chapter 9 insolvency can be easily applied to sovereign insolvency); Ann Pettifor,
Chapter 9/11? Resolving International Debt Crises – the Jubilee Framework for International
Insolvency, JUBILEE DEBT PROGRAMME (Jan. 2002), http://www.i-r-e.org/bdf/docs/a002_jubilee-
framework-for-international-insolvency.pdf (making the case for regulations that would both dis-
cipline lax lenders and reckless borrowers).
42. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
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B. The Ex Ante Perspective: Sovereign Debtors in Financial and/or
Economic Distress
1. Reputation and Signalling
Lending, as any commercial activity, is a bet. Creditors expect to be
compensated for their time and the risk they assume in providing debt capi-
tal (plus a spread), which shall incentivize creditors to overcome their in-
herent risk aversion.43 Pricing the “appropriate risk rate” includes an
estimation of (1) the risk of distress and (2) the loss in distress. Besides the
probability of financial distress and the necessity to restructure the debt,
creditors have to anticipate alternative scenarios of how other creditors, the
sovereign debtor, and, if applicable, third parties (European Central Bank
(ECB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Eurozone member states, etc.)
will behave in the case of financial and/or economic distress.
Therefore, creditors have to consider the rules of the game (i.e., the
factual and legal circumstances) under which all concerned parties act—not
the “legal rules in the book,” but their credible enforcement—the “law in
action.”44 Taking into account the already mentioned difficulty of enforcing
repayment against a sovereign debtor, the signaling effect of the sovereign’s
actions and the sovereign’s reputation to fulfill its obligation, even though
this may be currently burdensome, is at least as important as the sovereign’s
ability to serve its debt (e.g., by increasing the tax level).
The legal provisions to which a sovereign binds itself in a bond/loan
contract, or the law to which a sovereign subjects itself in an international
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, send out an initial signal to the
creditors.45 Creditors can calculate the hypothetical scenario of distress
under the assumption that the “law in the books” will be enforced as the
first step. Although one might question whether a debtor should raise
awareness of the possibility that its debt may need to be restructured, it is
irrational to assume that creditors would punish a debtor that foresees the
possibility of distress and implements a mechanism to pre-determine the
43. JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 85–86 (3d ed. 2014).
44. KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT 93–122 (2006); EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF
LAW (Walter L. Moll trans., 1936); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L.
REV. 12, 15 (1910).
45. In Stephan J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt
Contracts: A Greek Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism
(Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 541, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=17
13914, the authors show that creditors adjust their price expectations to the signal that a sovereign
sends out when making its bond contract subject to a different national law. For bonds with Greek
law as the governing law, creditors accordingly charged a risk premium, compared to bonds gov-
erned by English law.
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restructuring since the alternative would obviously be a disorderly
scenario.46
In this context, the market reaction to the introduction of a private
ordering bond debt restructuring regime: the question as to whether collec-
tive action clauses (i.e., the core element of a private ordering debt restruc-
turing regime) raise borrowing cost for certain creditors and lower
borrowing cost for other creditors is discussed controversially. Eichengreen
and Mody draw the conclusion that collective action clauses (at the time of
the study typical for U.K. bonds, not for U.S. bonds) decrease credit cost
for strong debtors and increase borrowing cost for weak debtors.47 They
connect the rise in borrowing cost with the expectation of moral hazard. A
study by Becker, Richards, and Thaichareon reveals a statistically less sig-
nificant impact of collective action clauses (CAC) and does not see any
negative effect on interest rates for weak debtors, concluding that strong
and weak debtors receive a marginal benefit from the implementation of
collective action clauses.48 In a more recent study, Bradley and Gulati eval-
uate data from the post-2002 period (i.e., after 2002, when CAC became a
common feature in U.S. bonds). They focus on different voting require-
ments for the modification of payment terms. According to their findings,
the implementation of CAC lowers the cost of capital, particularly for weak
debtors (with a positive correlation between lower voting standards and
46. The question as to whether collective action clauses (i.e., the core element of a private
ordering debt restructuring regime) raise borrowing cost for certain creditors and lower borrowing
cost for other creditors is controversial. See Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Do Collective
Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?, 114 ECON. J. 247 (2004) (drawing the conclusion that
collective action clauses [at the time of the study typical for U.K. bonds, not for U.S. bonds]
decrease credit cost for strong debtors and increase borrowing cost for weak debtors). Eichengreen
and Mody connect the rise in borrowing cost with the expectation of moral hazard. See Torbjo¨rn
Becker, Anthony Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are
Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J. OF INT’L ECON. 127 (2003) (revealing a statistically less
significant impact of collective action clauses and not seeing any negative effect on interest rates
for weak debtors, concluding that strong and weak debtors receive a marginal benefit from the
implementation of collective action clauses). A more recent study was conducted by Michael
Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis, REV.
OF FIN. 1 (2013). Bradley and Gulati also evaluated data from the post-2002 period (after 2002
CAC became a common feature in U.S. bonds). They focus on different voting requirements for
the modification of payment terms. According to their findings, the implementation of CAC low-
ers the cost of capital, in particular for weak debtors (with a positive correlation between lower
voting standards and lower bond spreads) while the correlation for high voting standards and high
bond spreads is negative for strong issuers (i.e. the lower the voting requirement for a change of
payment terms, the higher the bond spreads). The effect is more significant for weaker debtors.
Economic reasoning suggests that the chance to prevent holdout behavior should be valued by
creditors to the advantage of the debtor. However, low voting standards (i.e., a cheap exit route for
the debtor) send out a negative signal and may raise doubt about the debtor’s financial stability. A
balanced solution appears to be the implementation of a sovereign debt restructuring regime that
prevents opportunistic behavior on both sides (i.e., overcomes holdout strategies but at the same
time curtails the debtor’s misbehavior and closes the door for an opportunistic restructuring offer
by reasonable high voting standards). See supra Section III.A.2; infra Section IV.
47. Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 46.
48. Becker, Richards & Thaichareon, supra note 46.
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lower bond spreads), while the correlation for high voting standards and
high bond spreads is negative for strong issuers (i.e., the lower the voting
requirement for a change of payment terms, the higher the bond spreads).
The effect is more significant for weaker debtors.49 Economic reasoning
suggests that the chance to prevent holdout behavior should be valued by
creditors to the advantage of the debtor. However, low voting standards
(i.e., a cheap exit route for the debtor) send out a negative signal and may
raise doubt about the debtor’s financial stability. A balanced solution ap-
pears to be the implementation of a sovereign debt restructuring regime that
prevents opportunistic behavior on both sides (i.e., overcomes holdout strat-
egies but at the same time curtails the debtor’s misbehavior and closes the
door for an opportunistic restructuring offer by reasonably high voting
standards).50
However, the availability of a sovereign debt restructuring mecha-
nism—either in public or private ordering—may also lead to an “efficient”
rise in interest rates for certain debtors that were previously assumed to be
bailed out in case of distress.51 As I will later show, such an increase in the
cost of debt capital for some creditors leads to overall efficiency in an equi-
librium, and finally, even benefits weaker sovereign debtors since their po-
litical agents are incentivized to work toward a solid budget in the long run.
A history of unilateral cessation of payments (i.e., of broken debt
promises) shows that the “law in the books” does not suffice as a founda-
tion for risk assessment.52 The law is not worth the paper if it cannot be
enforced. The debtor’s performance and willingness to cooperate contrib-
utes to its reputation. The same is true for a no-bailout principle in the
European treaties,53 which has proven to be without value.54 Reputation
building is costly but should pay off in an option value (e.g., more invest-
ment offers), lower risk rates for a reliable and predictable debt service,55
and in the avoidance of a pooling equilibrium for a credible no-bailout
policy.56
While the process of reputation building is relatively cumbersome,
reputation can be lost abruptly, and the retrieval of reputation requires even
more effort and time than its initial acquisition. Reputation building takes
place via reliable exercise of rules, even though acting in accordance with
the rules may be a current disadvantage to the actor. In contrast, the expec-
tation that the actor will adhere to a particular set of rules is destroyed with
49. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 46.
50. See supra Section III.A.2; see infra Section IV.
51. Blankart & Ehmke (work in progress), supra note 37; Blankart & Ehmke, supra note 37.
52. See supra Section III.A.4 with further references, especially supra notes 35–38.
53. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 123,
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (I 125).
54. Blankart & Ehmke, supra note 36, at 670–75.
55. See infra Section III.B.4.
56. See infra Section III.B.3.
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the actor’s (intentional) violation of similar rules.57 The opportunistic
breach of rules can always be seen as an indicator of an actor’s future
behavior.58
In the case of a transfer union, the focus on the reputation of the debtor
shifts to the reputation of the guarantor for the calculation of the cost of
capital.59 However, investors can still rely upon a sovereign’s past opportu-
nistic behavior to draw conclusions about the sovereign’s tendency to act
opportunistically for a short-term gain as a national lawmaker.60
2. The Stigma of the Unreliable Debtor
a. The Effect of the Sovereign Debtor’s Reputation on its
Reliability as a Debtor in its Future Lending
Relations
Clearly, the reliability of a debtor to honor its debt impacts the debtor’s
options for debt capital acquisition and the cost of debt capital. This can be
traced quite easily by comparing interest rates and the success of bond issu-
ances and relating this data to the credit history of a sovereign debtor (i.e.,
not only the mere fact that a sovereign defaulted on its debt obligations but
in particular, the concrete loss suffered by creditors is important, as empiri-
cal data suggests). The cost of default in sovereign debt lending can be
defined as (1) the exclusion from the debt markets, and (2) the risk pre-
mium charged for the debtor’s anticipated opportunism and calculated on
its past unreliability.61 Empirical research confirms the theoretical analy-
57. In Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial Versus General
Reputations, 39 INT’L ECON. REV. 55 (1998) (theoretically proving that a sovereign’s reputation as
a debtor has an impact on its reputation in other areas [e.g., that a sovereign that breaches a debt
contract can be expected to act similarly opportunistically in other areas of investment]).
58. See generally Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on
the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989) (illustrating the functionality of reputational
enforcement mechanisms on the example of long-distance/oversea trade and medieval trade in a
time when monitoring and legal enforcement was weak).
59. Blankart & Ehmke (work in progress), supra note 37; Blankart & Ehmke, supra note 37,
at 178–79.
60. See supra Section III.B.2.
61. Juan Cruces and Christoph Trebesch find, based on a profound empirical analysis, that
the size of a haircut is positively correlated to (1) the time that a sovereign is excluded from
capital markets, and (2) the increase of bond spreads. Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, Sover-
eign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts (Monetary Pol’y & Int’l Fin., Working Paper No. 3604,
2011). This paper confirms the theoretical analysis and quite intuitive reasoning that creditors
account for the sovereign debtor’s previous behavior for their future investment decisions. See
Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 48 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 289 (1989); Sule Ozler, Have Commercial Banks Ignored
History?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 608 (1993) (empirically highlighting the increased cost of debt
financing for previous defaults in commercial bank lending). Christine Richmond and Daniel Dias
find that a sovereign debtor takes an average of 5.7 years to regain partial market access (defined
as net positive bank and bond transfers) and 8.4 years for full market access (defined as net
positive borrowings exceeding 1 percent GDP) (period analyzed: 1980–2005). Christine Rich-
mond & Daniel A. Dias, Duration of Capital Market Exclusion: An Empirical Investigation (July
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sis62 and quite intuitive reasoning that creditors account for the sovereign
debtor’s previous behavior for their future investment decisions. Cruces and
Trebesch, for instance, find based on a profound empirical analysis that the
size of a haircut is positively correlated to (1) the time that a sovereign is
excluded from capital markets and (2) the increase of bond spreads.63 Rich-
mond and Dias find that a sovereign debtor takes in average 5.7 years to
regain partial market access (defined as net positive bank and bond trans-
fers) and 8.4 years for full market access (defined as net positive borrow-
ings exceeding one percent GDP) for the period analyzed 1980–2005.
Moreover, they prove that debtors having suffered from a shock out of their
control (i.e., a natural catastrophe) regain market access significantly faster.
This observation is in line with the reputation hypothesis. If a debtor totters
because of events out of its control, creditors will not deduce that the debtor
is unreliable and will not punish the debtor as if the default were caused by
an opportunistic budget policy, et cetera.64
b. The Effect of the Sovereign Debtor’s Reputation as a
National Lawmaker and as a “Host Country” for
Foreign Investments
It is harder to find a price tag for another effect of the sovereign
debtor’s misbehavior—in lending relations, sovereigns meet with their
creditors in capital markets as legal equals, though the reality is often differ-
ent.65 In the context of foreign investments in local businesses, sovereigns
have the ultimate decision-making power over their own national law—as
the case may be, subject to international law obligations.66 Trade partners,
entrepreneurs, and foreign investors, who are considering an investment in
a private business or trade with a local company, care about the law that
1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027844.
Debtors that have suffered from a shock out of their control (i.e., a natural catastrophe) regain
market access significantly faster. This observation is in line with the reputation hypothesis. If a
debtor totters because of events out of its control, creditors will not deduce that the debtor is
unreliable and will not punish the debtor as if the default were caused by an opportunistic budget
policy, et cetera. Gelos et al. see a downward trend in the time of market exclusion: approximately
two years after default for the 1990s. Their focus is on partial market access (taking the definition
of Dias and Richmond). See R. Gaston Gelos, Ratna Sahay & Guido Sandleris, Sovereign borrow-
ing by developing countries: What determines market access?, 83 J. OF INT’L ECON. 243 (2011).
62. Eaton & Gersovitz, supra note 61.
63. Cruces & Trebesch, supra note 61. See Ozler, supra note 61 (empirically highlighting the
increased cost of debt financing for previous defaults in commercial bank lending).
64. Richmond & Dias, supra note 61. See Gelos et al., supra note 61 (noting a downward
trend in the time of market exclusion: approximately two years after default for the 1990s. Their
focus is on partial market access [taken the definition of Dias and Richmond]).
65. See supra Sections II.B, III.A.4.
66. The sovereign may have made itself subject to investor-protection agreements. See e.g.,
Jo¨rn-Axel Ka¨mmerer, Der Schutz des Eigentums im Vo¨lkerrecht, in BITBURGER GESPR ¨ACHE 143
(2004).
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governs their contractual arrangements.67 If the national lawmaker can be
assumed to opportunistically change the law and discriminate against for-
eign investors, investors will price in the concomitant risk of their invest-
ment. Hence, the assumption is that a sovereign that unlawfully neglects its
debt obligations will be even more willing to act opportunistically as a na-
tional lawmaker, which will have a deterrent effect on foreign investments
into the national economy.68
Empirical research supports the analytically consequent assumption
that an unreliable debtor is expected to be an unreliable “host country” for
foreign investments: Arteta and Hale find that a sovereign debt crisis leads
to a drop of more than 20 percent for debt capital lending to private firms
for the time of debt restructuring negotiations and more than two years after
the debt renegotiations were concluded—the results are already adjusted to
a decline in the macroeconomic performance due to the debt crisis (i.e.,
demand for credit); without adjustment the drop would amount to 30–40
percent. Notably, voluntary restructuring strategies (e.g., debt buybacks) did
not show similar negative effects.69 Rose empirically investigates that the
question as to whether debt renegotiations in the Paris Club have a negative
effect on bilateral trade between the debtor and its creditor countries and
finds a decline in trade of 8 percent per year for a period of fifteen years.
Rose does not empirically analyze the reasons for that decline. However,
67. The impact of national insolvency law on investment decisions, for instance, has been
empirically evaluated. See Sergei A. Davydenko & Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy Codes Mat-
ter? A Study of Defaults in France, Germany, and the U.K., 63 J. OF FIN. 565 (2008); Rainer
Haselmann, Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, How Law Affects Lending, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUD.
549 (2010); Rafael La Porta & Florencia Lopez-de-Silanes, Creditor Protection and Bankruptcy
Reform, in RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS – AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE DE-
SIGN OF BANKRUPTCY LAWS 65 (Stjin Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Ashoka Mody eds., 2001).
68. Carlos Arteta and Galina Hale find that a sovereign debt crisis leads to a drop of more
than 20 percent for debt capital lending to private firms for the time of debt restructuring negotia-
tions and more than two years after the debt renegotiations were concluded—the results are al-
ready adjusted to a decline in the macroeconomic performance due to the debt crisis (i.e., demand
for credit); without adjustment the drop would amount to 30–40 percent. Notably, voluntary re-
structuring strategies (e.g., debt buybacks) did not have the outlined negative effect. Carlos Arteta
& Galina Hale, Sovereign Debt Crises and Credit to the Private Sector, 74 J. OF INT’L ECON. 53
(2008). Andrew Rose empirically investigates the question as to whether debt renegotiations in the
Paris Club have a negative effect on bilateral trade between the debtor and its creditor countries
and finds a decline in trade of 8 percent per year for a period of fifteen years. Rose does not
empirically analyze the reasons for that decline. However, one should note that Rose deals with
debt renegotiations in an institutional setting. A debtor that breaks its debt promise, makes an
exchange offer designed as blackmail, and escapes lawful enforcement signals a substantially high
degree of short-sighted opportunism that should cause further damage to its trade balance. Andrew
K. Rose, One reason countries pay their debts: Renegotiation and international trade, 77 J. OF
DEV. ECON. 189 (2005). For the theoretical account see Cole & Kehoe, supra note 57. Similarly,
Fuentes and Saravia make an empirical analysis using data from past defaults in debt owed to
official creditors and FDI flows with the result that default is punished with less foreign direct
investments from creditor countries depending on the frequency of default and the size of the
haircut, supporting the reputation hypothesis. See Miguel Fuentes & Diego Saravia, Sovereign
Defaulters: Do International Capital Markets Punish Them?, 91 J. OF DEV. ECON. 336 (2010).
69. Arteta & Hale, supra note 68.
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one should note that Rose deals with debt renegotiations in an institutional
setting. A debtor that breaks its debt promise, makes an exchange offer
designed as a blackmail, and escapes lawful enforcement signals a substan-
tially high degree of short-sighted opportunism that should cause further
damage to its trade balance.70 Similarly, Fuentes and Saravia make an em-
pirical analysis using data from past defaults in debt owed to official credi-
tors and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows with the result that default is
punished with less FDI from creditor countries depending on the frequency
of default and the size of the haircut, supporting the reputation hypothesis.71
Of course, investors can partially shield themselves from opportunistic
national lawmakers by choosing a different national law for their contract or
another jurisdiction for trial. The reason, therefore, could be that a different
national law is more sophisticated and advanced in its understanding of
business cases. However, even though foreign investors may secure a title
for their claim in foreign courts with legal certainty, the market value of
their claim is determined by the probability that they can actually enforce
their claim.72 Thus, the question arises as to whether the enforcement vari-
ables in the country of local investment provide for an efficient and predict-
able outcome.
Again, the most decisive player is often the sovereign. If the national
law or its practical application by the local courts does not recognize the
foreign judgment, or set legal or factual barriers for enforcement, the title
will be worth far less if there are not sufficient attachable assets abroad in
which there is a promising perspective of enforcement. An obvious reaction
may be to require assets to be held in trust as security for investments in
businesses based in a country with a poor reputation. The chilling effect for
investments in the national economy would be tremendously expensive. Lo-
cal businesses, especially those in developing countries, which themselves
cannot credibly signal to perform their obligations without the Damocles
sword of an effective and predictable judicial infrastructure for law enforce-
ment and an efficient insolvency law, would suffer the most from the lack
of the sovereign’s reputation.73 Only those local businesses that have suffi-
cient assets abroad or have already established an international reputation,
which they will be in danger of losing if they hide behind a discriminatory
national law, could send out a signal that would help them escape the
shadows of their home country’s (suspected) misbehavior. Eventually, tak-
70. Rose, supra note 68. For the theoretical account see Cole & Kehoe, supra note 57.
71. Fuentes & Saravia, supra note 68.
72. See supra Sections II.B, III.A.4.
73. See Davydenko & Franks, supra note 67; Haselmann, Pistor & Vig, supra note 67; La
Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes, supra note 67. These authors underline the importance of law for eq-
uity and debt investments. The Doing Business studies by the World Bank deal similarly with the
legal environment for investments.
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ing the easy route in the short run is likely to have harmful consequences
for the national economy in the long run.
The inferences about a sovereign’s behavior in its own lending rela-
tions based on its behavior as a national lawmaker are rational. This conclu-
sion will hold even more true if one notes that the national lawmaker is
indeed “sovereign” in its national legal policy (if not bound by international
law), which makes it easier for a national lawmaker to play ex post opportu-
nistic strategies.74 The sovereign that breaches a lending contract for a
short-run benefit can hardly be assumed to apply a reliable policy of legal
certainty and impartiality with a focus on long-run reputation building.
Even if the sovereign did, it would be difficult to credibly signal a sound
national legal policy. An orderly procedure can help reestablish the “rule of
law” as an economic principle.75
3. Reflections of a Bailout
In a complete market economy, the risk rate reflects the success of the
sovereign’s budgetary policy and exerts a disciplinary function for the gov-
ernment. The cost of debt capital honor and punish the sovereign’s perform-
ance, which gives the sovereign an incentive to invest effort and to follow
the path of a sound budgetary policy. In the long run, creditors, but even
more, the debtor itself, will benefit from this incentive mechanism.76
In order to collect the benefits of a successful and/or promising budg-
etary policy, the sovereign has to credibly signal its performance and a de-
creased risk of default to the capital markets. In a transfer union, the risk
rate is not calculated by the individual debtor’s performance, but by the
probability of a bailout and the overall transfer union’s performance.77 The
expectation of a bailout is a distortion of the individualized risk assessment.
If a predictable procedure for debt restructuring is missing and if a bailout is
likely, the credit costs will tend towards a pooling equilibrium rather than a
74. See generally Cole & Kehoe, supra note 57 (establishing the theoretical account). For an
empirical account related to that question, see Fuentes & Saravia, supra note 68.
75. See infra Section IV.
76. Blankart & Ehmke (work in progress), supra note 37; Blankart & Ehmke, supra note 37.
77. The bond yields for ten-year government bonds issued by eurozone member states illus-
trate the creditors’ calculation. The closer the introduction of the euro came, the more the bond
spreads converged. Even though the Maastricht Treaty signals a policy of self-responsibility (no
bailout), the market anticipated that the no-bailout provisions would not be enforced—a pooling
equilibrium led to almost similar bond spreads (e.g., Greece profited from being a member of an
expected transfer union and gained access to cheap debt capital). Following the Ecofin decision on
October 5, 2008, holding that member states should guarantee their national bank’s debt and the
feasible distress of certain peripheral Euro member states, the bond spreads of weak debtors in-
creased sharply. A remainder of doubt as to whether a bailout would take place is the most reason-
able explanation. The bailout, which then actually took place, was followed by a convergence of
bond spreads. For an analysis of the pooling equilibrium problem in the EMU, see Charles B.
Blankart, What the Euro Zone Could Learn from Switzerland, Institute of Economic Affairs (May
18, 2015), http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/what-the-euro-zone-could-learn-from-switzerland; Blankart
& Ehmke (work in progress), supra note 37; Blankart & Ehmke, supra note 37.
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clear-cut separating equilibrium,78 which will punish the debtors in a good
way and reward the debtors in a bad way.79 Then the incentive to invest
effort will diminish and the moral hazard will rule on the side of creditors
and debtors, so that the cost of the bailout may turn out to be enormous.
4. Reflections of a Broken Promise
If one wanted to take a biased perspective in favor of the sovereign,
assuming that the citizens would suffer the most from savings and taxation
and blame the creditors for being “greedy investors,” there would not be a
good reason to take a different view as in the previous sections. It is still in
the best interests of the sovereign’s citizens to have strong creditors that can
enforce their rights and a sovereign that keeps its promises and subjects
itself to a public or private ordering debt restructuring procedure. Lending
to sovereigns is not a charity for private creditors. The ex ante reflections of
risky and uncertain ex post outcomes can affect developing countries with a
less established reputation in lending relations more harshly.80 This does
not apply only to the terms of lending and pricing (i.e., an unnecessarily
high-risk rent for less stable countries that are unlikely to expect a bailout).
Investors may draw conclusions about the state of legal certainty and the
rule of law in a country from the sovereign debtor’s breach of credit con-
tracts in the past, so that private businesses suffer from their home coun-
tries’ “misbehavior” as a debtor.81 If creditors are uncertain about a specific
sovereign debtor’s credibility, other “comparable” sovereign debtors’ previ-
ous and current behavior will have an influence on the creditors’ calculation
about the expected sovereign debtor’s performance in distress. Accordingly,
the higher the uncertainty is, the more sovereign debtors suffer from exter-
nal effects of other sovereign debtor’s misbehavior. It is in the debtor’s own
interest to build up its reputation in order to have the ability to credibly
signal its commitment to fulfill its debt obligations so as to enhance options
for debt capital acquisition and to lower interest rates (i.e., the risk rate
component).
Assuming that the sovereign has to pay dearly for its broken promise,
there are still multiple reasons why sovereigns default. First, the absence of
an orderly insolvency procedure in public and/or private ordering may force
sovereigns to walk a misleading path.82 Second, even though it may be in
the interests of the sovereign’s citizens, the political agents and decision-
78. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. OF
ECON. 355 (1973).
79. Blankart & Ehmke (work in progress), supra note 37; Blankart & Ehmke, supra note 37.
80. Ozler, supra note 61, at 614–16 (pointing out that countries that just recently become
sovereign have to pay a risk premium [i.e., a reliable credit history let credit cost decrease]).
81. See supra Section III.B.2.
82. See supra Section III.A.2.
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makers’ interests can be distinct. If negative effects of their decision surface
with significant delay, it is tempting for politicians to heavily discount
(down to zero) those consequences that are less likely to damage their polit-
ical reputation.83 The problem of time inconsistency in politics appears
when politicians only take into account those consequences that affect their
reputation and could cause their position to totter. If flaws of a broken debt
promise are hidden, the incentive for a reasonable and sometimes uncom-
fortable budgetary policy will fade. Moreover, even though the strategy to
declare a cessation of payments on certain debt claims may be damaging to
the national economy, politicians may gain a popularity bonus when they
can blame “greedy investors” and “vulture funds” for their countries’ “mis-
fortune.” A populist scapegoat strategy may not improve the sovereign’s
economic situation, but may help politicians gain reelection. The strength of
an efficient sovereign debt-restructuring regime is that its existence closes
down the exit route for unilateral actions justified by the emergency situa-
tion of a troubled debtor confronted with a cloudy body of creditors without
any regulatory procedure to resolve the crisis.
From an ex ante perspective, any regime that responds to challenges of
financial and/or economic distress can be evaluated according to the criteria
of ex post efficiency, since all concerned parties that are able to adjust react
ex ante to expected ex post outcomes. Investors make their investment deci-
sions based on their expectations about the sovereign debtor’s or national
lawmaker’s future behavior—before and during financial and/or economic
distress.
C. Reality Check: Painful Solidarity and Blackmail
1. A Greek Tragedy
The prologue of the Greek debt crisis foreshowed a tragic end for
Greece and its apparently “noble rescuers.” The faulty institutional design
of the European treaties and political opportunism are the slow-acting
poison for the Euro Monetary Union. When Greece became a member of
the EMU, it was not because Greece was able to meet the criteria of budget-
ary discipline, but because of a cabal by the Greek administration. Other
members of the EMU turned a blind eye to the betrayal.84 To be fair, Ger-
83. Christian Kirchner, Public Choice and New Institutional Economics, in PUBLIC ECONOM-
ICS AND PUBLIC CHOICE, CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOR OF CHARLES B. BLANKART 19, 21–23 (Pio
Baake & Rainald Borck eds., 2007); Christian Kirchner & David Ehmke, Economics of Legal
Concepts for Management Compensation Schemes in the Credit Sector and of their Regulation –
A Critical Contribution to the European Regulatory Discussion, OXFORD U. COMP. L. F. (2013),
http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/kirchner_ehmke2.shtml.
84. Charlotte Forelle and Stephen Fidler, Europe’s Original Sin: National Leaders Ignored
Greece’s Soaring Debt for Years, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 3, 2010), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704548604575097800234925746; Allan Little, How
‘Magic’ Made Greek Debt Disappear Before it Joined the Euro, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012) http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16834815.
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many and France did undermine the credibility of the EMU criteria for a
sustainable budget and therewith sent out a fatal signal to the Southern Eu-
ropean countries.85 Eventually, an entirely diverse group of sovereigns with
strong and highly developed economies on the one hand, and comparatively
weak economies on the other hand, started the common adventure of the
euro.
The early euro years started in harmony. With a common currency,
barriers for trade, such as unsteady exchange rates, were removed. Espe-
cially businesses that could produce high-quality goods cost-effectively
could increase their exports substantially. Businesses in countries with less
developed industries struggled to keep pace in competition with one single
European currency. Their governments had given away the opportunity to
devalue their national currency so as to increase the attractiveness of their
national products for domestic and foreign buyers. What could have soon
turned into a disaster stayed under the surface for quite some time. Sover-
eigns with a backward economy and a poor budgetary performance gained
access to the common pool of a transfer union. Debt for EMU member
states was priced at almost the same interest rates with just insignificant
spreads between strong and weak debtors. Cheap debt enabled the govern-
ments of countries with poor economic performance to delay necessary, but
painful, and most crucially, unpopular reforms. They could cure the symp-
toms of economic failure in competition with other EMU member states
under one single currency; without that, they had to deal with the underly-
ing problems until the Ponzi game would end.
There is only one rational explanation why Greece could borrow at a
“German” rate, since the incremental risk of an unsustainable debt burden
did not decrease but increased. The markets, however, expected Greece to
be rescued if it became bankrupt. The markets were right. Giant rescue
packages were tied and dispatched to Greece once it could not continue its
Ponzi scheme on the markets anymore. However, European Financial Sta-
bility Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) were es-
tablished to grant credits and guarantees to Greece without a realistic
prospect of being repaid, and most importantly, at interest rates that did not
remotely reflect the default risk.86
Illustrative of this development are the bond yields for ten-year gov-
ernment bonds issued by eurozone member states. The closer the introduc-
tion of the euro came, the more the bond spreads converged until there was
85. Allan Little, Did Germany Sow the Seeds of the Eurozone Debt Crisis?, BBC NEWS (Jan.
29, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16761087.
86. Werner Mussler, Hilfskredite ersparen den Griechen 8,5 Milliarden, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (June 19, 2014), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/eurokrise/griechen
land/hilfskredite-ersparen-griechenland-8-5-milliarden-euro-12999178.html; FAZ, Griechenland
Zahlt Weniger Zinsen als der Bund, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Jan. 2, 2015),  http://
www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/schuldendienst-griechenland-zahlt-weniger-zin
sen-als-der-bund-13350685.html.
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a negligible spread—interest rates were calculated in a pooling equilibrium.
Following the Ecofin decision on October 5, 2008, which held that member
states should guarantee their national bank’s debt and the feasible distress
of certain peripheral Euro member states, the bond spreads of weak debtors
increased sharply. A remainder of doubt as to whether a bailout would take
place is the most reasonable explanation. The bailout, which then actually
took place, was followed by a convergence of bond spreads. The pooling
equilibrium was reestablished. Most notably, a new and even more attrac-
tive source of cheap money came into existence: the European “rescue
loans.”87
The consequences of a European act of solidarity were devastating.
While a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism may cause the concern that
it does not fully respect the sovereignty of the debtor, the price of a bailout
is substantially higher for the debtor and its saviors. Since a common pool
financing with independent budgets is logically incoherent and sets perverse
incentives to contribute less and to spend more,88 the payers do have to take
over control so as to enforce a reasonable budgetary policy. The factually
insolvent debtor has to give up autonomy and sovereignty. The diktat of the
troika89 in eurozone member states with unsustainable debt levels, which
received support from the eurozone member states, the ECB, and the IMF,
is such an attempt to reestablish the link between risk-bearing, responsibil-
ity, and control. The political protest in distressed euro zone member states
subject to a harsh austerity policy illustrates the displeasure and disagree-
ment with such bailout policies that, consequently, come with a price tag in
terms of less autonomy and sovereignty.
So far the theory of how a transfer union has to be designed is essen-
tially that control and responsibility need to go hand in hand. The fact,
however, that the eurozone transfer union is unsustainable is due to the
sovereignty of its members. With the election of the Tsipras administration,
the Greek people have expressed their disapproval of a bailout policy that
came with strict conditions for austerity measures. In a recent referendum,90
the Greek people rejected the austerity conditions they were supposed to be
made subject to. The lenience the public creditors can encourage other na-
tions to avoid or delay necessary but uncomfortable reforms—a contagious
effect of a loose link between responsibility and control. While a politically
opportunistic response to the Greek vote is quite likely a prolongation of the
Ponzi scheme so as to disguise the malinvestment into the EMU “rescue”
policy, a rational decision would be to consider the EFSF and ESM loans
87. See Blankart, supra note 77 (analyzing the pooling equilibrium problem in the EMU);
Blankart & Ehmke (work in progress), supra note 37; Blankart & Ehmke, supra note 37.
88. See supra Section III.B.3.
89. European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund.
90. Greece Debt Crisis: Greek Voters Reject Bailout Offer, BBC NEWS (July 6, 2015), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33403665.
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and guarantees sunk costs and to turn the wheel to the exit of a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism.
2. The Argentina Gamble
After a sharp economic downturn since the late ‘90s, Argentina, which
had accumulated an unsustainable amount of debt, defaulted on its out-
standing debt obligations at the end of 2001. In order to regain access to the
capital markets and foreign currencies so as to finance its imports, Argen-
tina approached its creditors with an exchange offer for their bonds in 2005
and 2010. The offer stipulated a significant haircut (the new bonds should
be valued at around one-third of their original face value). After the 2010
debt exchange, bondholders representing almost 93 percent in face value
had exchanged their bonds, leaving approximately 7 percent of debt owed
to holdout creditors. Argentina has refused to repay its holdout creditors so
far, but rather attacked them as ruthless vulture funds.91
As previously discussed in Section III.A.4, there is a different way to
think about the role of holdouts. The Argentina exchange offer can be seen
as being extortionate—creditors were left without a realistic prospect to en-
force their claim against Argentina. Even though they still held their legal
claim they were confronted with a “take it or leave it” offer. The debtor,
eventually, fashioned the conditions of its own debt restructuring. Traded
bonds were concentrated in the ownership of specialized distressed debt
funds that took up the challenge to enforce against Argentina. Apart from
previous attempts to enforce against Argentina, the most promising strategy
by the “holdout” creditors was to block Argentina’s access to the capital
markets.
The Southern District Court of New York held in favor of the hold-
outs, led by Neuberger Berman MLP Income Fund Inc. (NML), finding that
the original debt claims were valid and that Argentina was not entitled to
make payments on newly issued bonds unless the original bond claims were
satisfied equally. Otherwise, Argentina would be in breach of the pari passu
clause that was part of the original bond documentation. Argentina appealed
and the “holdout creditors” succeeded again.92 In order to effectively collect
their debt claim confirmed by the Southern District Court, NML served
subpoenas on two banks so as to discover Argentina’s property. The South-
ern District Court ordered compliance with the subpoena regarding the dis-
covery of attachable assets. An appeal against this order was first dismissed
91. AudiovisualTelam, Speech of the President Cristina Ferna´ndez During the United Na-
tions General Assembly, New York, USA, YOUTUBE (Sept. 27, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=EyShGogzIn4#t=1267. In this line, see Stand with Argentina Against the Debt Vultures,
JUBILEE DEBT CAMPAIGN, http://jubileedebt.org.uk/actions/support-argentinas-fight-against-vul
ture-funds (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
92. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012).
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by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.93 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings.94
Argentina faced a dilemma: in the exchange of offer bonds, Argentina
had implemented a rights upon future offers clause (RUFO), which would
grant the creditors that had accepted Argentina’s restructuring plan the right
to be paid in full if other creditors received full satisfaction. So, Argentina
could either pay all creditors at full or face default. Argentina lacked the
cash for the first option, so that it was forced into default without access to
the New York capital markets. After the RUFO clause expired at the end of
2014, the Kirchner administration had aggressively blamed the holdout
creditors for Argentina’s misfortune. In lacking the political will to proceed
with a cooperative debt restructuring, the price tag for a unilateral cessation
of payments that the Argentinean population had to pay was high.95
IV. HOW TO ESCAPE THE VICIOUS CYCLE
A. The Economics of Insolvency Transferred to the Case of
Sovereign Debt
In a private sector economy, insolvency performs a collective debt col-
lection and asset distribution function ex post,96 and restructuring and reor-
ganization may lead to a brighter future for the debtor’s business. Thus,
insolvency crucially shapes credit relations ex ante. Lending practices re-
flect expectations about the state of financial distress. Before the problem of
an unsustainable debt burden occurs, insolvency procedures exert a discipli-
nary effect on debtors and creditors, ameliorate problems of strategic and
opportunistic behavior, and essentially strengthen the link between risk and
return so as to avoid moral hazard.97 In the case of corporate debt lending,
the stick or carrot that insolvency procedures provide for the directors sig-
nificantly influences their actions in the vicinity of insolvency.98 Orderly
93. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 203 (2nd Cir. 2012).
94. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014).
95. See Howard S. Steel, Elnaz Zarrini & Arkady A. Goldinstein, NML Capital v Argentina:
A Lesson in Indenture Interpretation, 8 INSOLVENCY AND RESTRUCTURING INT’L 31 (2014); Jon
Hartley, Argentina’s Default: Lessons Learned, What Happens Next, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2014/08/04/argentinas-default-lessons-learned-and-what-
happens-next/; Argentina Suffers from Fresh Defeat in Default Row, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 12,
2015),  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/11468637/Argentina-suffers-fresh-de
feat-in-default-row.html.
96. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L. J. 857 (1982); THOMAS JACKSON, LOGIC
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986).
97. Ehmke, supra note 26, at Section “Economic Theory of Insolvency”.
98. Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison, in
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 467 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari &
Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-1\UST101.txt unknown Seq: 25  8-JAN-16 12:12
2015] SOVEREIGN DEBTORS IN DISTRESS 25
insolvency is of utmost importance in achieving ex ante and ex post effi-
ciency. The question is whether and with what modifications the economic
arguments in favor of an orderly insolvency procedure for private debtors
hold once they are transferred in the case of sovereign debt.
First, in the case of private debtors, the common pool problem is a
strong argument for a collective procedure. The pool of assets available for
distribution is limited, and individual enforcement could lead to an ineffi-
cient deployment of resources, in particular, if resources are worth more
held together than in piecemeal liquidation. From an ex ante and ex post
perspective, a disorderly race to enforcement would burden all creditors
with increased and unnecessary multiplied monitoring, litigation, and en-
forcement costs.99 In the case of a sovereign debtor, there is neither a liqui-
dation scenario nor a strong chance for individual enforcement if the
sovereign does not hold attachable assets abroad.100 The debtor is less vul-
nerable against individual enforcement, which could raise doubt about the
necessity for a collective procedure.
There is another side of the coin—the fact that the debtor is less vul-
nerable makes the individual creditors, in the absence of an orderly collec-
tion and distribution procedure, more vulnerable.101 If there is not a
transparent registration of claims held by bondholders, commercial banks,
and sovereign creditors, and if the sovereign can arbitrarily decide to rene-
gotiate the debt contracts with selected creditors and repay certain creditors
in full or subject to an “unilaterally enforced haircut,” there will be a risk of
opportunistic behavior by the sovereign. The sovereign debtor can discrimi-
nate in favor of those creditors with which the sovereign has close and/or
constant credit, trade, and/or political relations, domestic creditors,102 or
those creditors with a strong bargaining position. Predictable and factually
enforced procedural rules for debt restructuring may block the sovereign
debtor’s way to hidden opportunism. Again, what prevents the debtor from
cheating and reduces the creditors’ risk of being exploited ex post, benefits
the debtor ex ante in lower interest rates and improved options for debt
capital acquisition.
Second, since a sovereign debtor will not be liquidated and can acquire
further assets by raising taxes, one could question whether the pool is lim-
99. Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, The Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy
Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1681–82 (1998).
100. Yanying Li, Question the Unquestionable Beauty of A Collective Proceeding for All Sov-
ereign Debt Claims 21–23, 24–25 (Working Paper, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2234210.
101. See Porzecanski, supra note 38.
102. The discrimination between private bondholders is difficult to implement. Since creditors
can trade their claim on the secondary markets, we should expect an arbitrage trade from foreign
to domestic creditors. Guembel and Sussman suggest that the median voter’s preference to repay
domestic debt may, therefore, incentivize the sovereign’s government to repay its bond debt. Al-
exander Guembel & Oren Sussman, Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties, 76 REV. OF ECON.
STUD. 1297 (2009).
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ited. Moreover, one could ask whether all debt should be dealt with in a
single collective procedure since debt with a distant maturity date could—if
not being included in the collective procedure—become due in a time when
the debtor has fully recovered.103 However, similar considerations apply to
the case of private debtors that continue trading to serve their obligation on
a going-concern basis, possibly in a different ownership structure. So, if one
rejected a sovereign debt restructuring procedure based on the argument
that the pool is not limited, one could also make the corresponding argu-
ment that there is not a necessity for a collective procedure for corporate
debt restructuring. Moreover, the statement that the pool of assets available
for distribution to the creditors of the sovereign debtor is not limited creates
the illusion that the sovereign had an unlimited tax potential. Eventually,
the potential for taxation is limited and depends on the national economy.
Increasing the tax rate may—in the long run—even decrease the tax vol-
ume, as it can harm the economy. Surely, the assessment of a sovereign’s
potential to repay its debt is a daunting task. Considering the associated
potential for hidden opportunistic actions by the sovereign, it becomes even
more obvious that increasing the creditors’ collective bargaining power in
an orderly and transparent procedure is of utmost importance.
Third, a sovereign debtor has creditors that pursue interests different
from the return on their investment and are more willing to forgive debt.104
Lending may have been motivated by the intention to stabilize or to pro-
mote a political ally or by the possibility to wield political influence by
attaching conditions to the loan. Even though the interest may be an eco-
nomic one, it may not be the debtor’s payments on the loan, but the option
value of established relations that motivated the investment decision. Credi-
tors with interests other than the immediate return on their investment can
be assumed to be more lenient and rather willing to accept a substantial
haircut. This specialty does not contradict the need for a collective proce-
dure at all. The par conditio creditorum or pari passu principle does not
prevent debtors and creditors from individually negotiating a higher haircut
than normal. Equal treatment protection (within a class) prevents creditors
from being forced to sacrifice a greater share of their claim to fund the
preferred treatment of others.105 The separation of one debt restructuring
procedure into multiple procedures is marred by an institutional deficit (i.e.,
the possibility for opportunistic hold out behavior). Creditors could await
the haircut of other creditor groups in order to negotiate a more favorable
deal on the costs of previous creditor groups’ concessions. If the collective
procedure were split up into several parallel debt restructuring negotiations,
the prisoner’s dilemma situation, in which noncooperation and holding out
103. Li, supra note 100, at 21–23.
104. Id. at 26.
105. ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 9–12, 87–91, 235–43 (4th ed.
2011); CHRISTOPH THOLE, GL ¨AUBIGERSCHUTZ DURCH INSOLVENZRECHT 61–66 (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-1\UST101.txt unknown Seq: 27  8-JAN-16 12:12
2015] SOVEREIGN DEBTORS IN DISTRESS 27
is a dominant strategy, would just shift to another level.106 Moreover, a
collective procedure with a single restructuring plan offers the transparency
that can prevent opportunistic favoritism by the sovereign debtor. The eco-
nomically efficient solution is still a single vote (in groups) on a single
plan.107 Nevertheless, while the preferred satisfaction of certain debt re-
quires the creditors’ approval, a higher debt relief can be individually
agreed upon since it does not negatively affect (or may even benefit) other
creditors.
To summarize, the economic considerations that call for an insolvency
procedure in a private sector economy largely apply to the case of sovereign
debt. There are particularities which one has to bear in mind—a sovereign
will neither be liquidated nor be put under forced administration because of
its sovereign status or political considerations that play a role and may mo-
tivate other sovereigns to be lenient creditors. Taking this into account, a
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism can be designed to improve ex ante
and ex post efficiency.
B. Sovereign Debt Restructuring in Public Procedures
In the beginning of the 21st century, when Argentina defaulted, the
IMF came up with a prominent proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism in public ordering.108 The SDRM applied an insolvency proce-
dure to the special case of a sovereign debt crisis, and should have been
implemented through a change of the IMF statutes binding the IMF member
states, requiring them to change their national laws accordingly. Further
proposals for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism in public ordering
have been presented.109 As the realization that the SDRM would not be
instantly feasible,110 private ordering solutions for a sovereign debt restruc-
turing mechanism were designed after the model of the public ordering debt
106. Ehmke, supra note 26, at Section “Majority Amendment Clauses”; see Kirchner &
Ehmke, supra note 1.
107. Ehmke, supra note 26, at Section “Majority Amendment Clauses”; Kirchner & Ehmke,
supra note 1.
108. ANNE O. KRUEGER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN
DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2002); Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism,
Int’l Monetary Fund (Feb. 12, 2003) (approved by Franc¸ois Gianviti & Timothy Geithner) [here-
inafter Proposed Features]; The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism – Fur-
ther Considerations, Int’l Monetary Fund, (Nov. 27, 2002) (approved by Franc¸ois Gianviti &
Timothy Geithner) [hereinafter Design of the SDRM].
109. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a
Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763 (2003); Patrick Bolton,
Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bank-
ruptcy Practice Around the World, 50 INT’L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 41 (2003); Christoph
Paulus, A Statutory Proceeding for Restructuring Debts of Sovereign States, RECHT DER IN-
TERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT (RIW) 401 (2003); Christoph G. Paulus, Some Thoughts on
an Insolvency Procedure for Countries, 50 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 531 (2002).
110. For an analysis of why the SDRM proposed by the IMF and previous attempts to create a
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (in public ordering) have failed in the past, see Eric Hel-
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restructuring procedures.111 The features of the SDRM, which respond to
the challenges of distress, have model characteristics for a later sovereign
debt restructuring proposal, as outlined below.
1. Release and Termination
According to the IMF proposal, the right to release the procedure
should belong exclusively to the sovereign. This restriction can be attrib-
uted to the sovereignty of the debtor and the resulting voluntary character of
the procedure, which requires the debtor’s cooperation. Therefore, the
SDRM is less similar to insolvency procedures, which provide for coercive
instruments, and rather is more comparable to voluntary debt restructuring
schemes. Since negotiations about a debt restructuring plan require the will-
ingness of both sides, it makes sense to give the sovereign and creditors,
holding a qualified share of the outstanding debt that would be sufficient to
block a restructuring plan, the right to terminate the procedure.112
Even though the sovereign gains an exclusive right to release the pro-
cedure, the pure availability of a restructuring mechanism (a) exposes any
opportunistic escape to a unilateral cessation of payments because cheating
on creditors will not be justified as an exit option without alternatives, and
(b) is likely to cause harsh opposition by the taxpayers and voters in those
countries which would otherwise bailout the debtor. Thus, the sovereign is
under pressure to initiate the procedure when necessary. Moreover, the
debtor has an inherent interest to start the procedure early enough to pro-
vide an efficient collective mechanism to turn around the debtor.
2. Coordination and Information
The more fragmented the body of creditors, the more pressing the need
to assemble a representative committee to speak in favor of each creditor
class’s interest in order to secure a coordination of creditors’ interest at the
lowest possible transaction costs, and as the case may be, the confidential
evaluation of sensitive information. The committee itself has to be provided
with all requested information necessary to evaluate and negotiate the debt
restructuring plan.113
3. Plan, Fresh Capital, and Creditors’ Vote
The plan is finally a renegotiated debt contract between the parties, in
which the creditors assent to a reduction of the principal, the interest, a
prolongation of the debt, and so forth. Thereby, different groups may make
leiner, The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, 27 CONTRIBUTIONS
TO POL. ECON. 91 (2008).
111. See infra Section IV.C.
112. Design of the SDRM, supra note 108, at 56; Proposed Features, supra note 108, at 15.
113. Design of the SDRM, supra note 108, at 42–44.
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different concessions. A vote with (qualified) majorities, overall and in each
creditor group, would then bind all creditors. A binding majority vote is a
common feature in insolvency procedures and should overcome strategic
hold out behavior and prisoner’s dilemma situations. Debt claims directly or
indirectly (e.g., via the central bank) held by the debtor would be disquali-
fied since the debtor could obviously misuse its voting power.114 Since the
inflow of fresh debt capital stops once the situation of financial distress
becomes public, fresh capital should be granted priority status over other
debt claims upon the qualified approval of the creditors. According to the
IMF proposal, debt owed to the IMF should have unconditional (i.e., with-
out the creditors’ approval) priority, which understandably provoked
criticism.115
4. Guarding the Restructuring Procedure
National insolvency laws regularly provide for some kind of a morato-
rium (i.e., a stay on payments and enforcement). The initial proposal of the
SDRM contained an automatic stay.116 Since the debtor should have ample
leeway in choosing the debt to be restructured in the SDRM,117 the protec-
tion is rather one-sided. It prevents creditors from individual enforcement or
a grab race, but not necessarily debtor discrimination between its creditors.
This is a dangerous option for opportunism, as previously noted.118 In a
later version of the SDRM, the stay was replaced by a hotchpot rule. Ac-
cording to the hotchpot rule, creditors are excluded from payments in the
plan to the amount of a previously received payment on their claim, which
they have achieved through individual action.119 Different from a pro-rata
rule, the body of creditors has no legal claim against them to transfer the
proceeds of their action to the pool of assets available for distribution to all
creditors. Thus, the hotchpot rule prevents individual action if a creditor
expects to collect not substantially more than the restructuring plan satisfac-
tion quota.
114. Design of the SDRM, supra note 108, at 31–32, 44–45; Proposed Features, supra note
108, at 13.
115. Christoph Paulus, Die Rolle des Richters in Einem Ku¨nftigen SDRM, in Hans Haarmeyer
and Gerhard Kreft (eds) Insolvenzrecht im Wandel der Zeit – Festschrift fu¨r Hans-Peter Kirchhof
(ZAP-Verlag 2003) 421, 426 – 427; Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debt-
ors?, 43–44 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 53, 2003), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=384220.
116. Krueger, supra note 108, at 25–28.
117. Design of the SDRM, supra note 108, at 12–13.
118. See supra Section III.A.4.
119. Design of the SDRM, supra note 108, at 35–38; Proposed Features, supra note 108, at
10–13.
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5. Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum (SDDRF)
Disputes about the interpretation and compliance with SDRM rules
and questions concerning the debt contract should be dealt with by a spe-
cialized court having the last word and a vis attractiva concursus.120 The
advantage of the SDDRF would be the special knowledge acquired for sov-
ereign debt cases, the avoidance of forum shopping, and the legal certainty
to have a single authority to settle disputes. Eventually, the reputational
damage would be serious if the sovereign treated the decisions of the SD-
DRF, to which the sovereign had subjected itself to in the IMF statutes and
in its national law, with misconduct.
C. A Market Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Multiple proposals exist on how to deal with and resolve sovereign
debt crises in private ordering.121 Any set of rules for “fair, just, or equal”
treatment of creditors, but with the sovereign debtor remaining at the wheel
and without introducing a comprehensive procedure, is a desperate solution.
From a legal or normative perspective, one could ask whether illegal behav-
ior would be “more” justified if the violation of the law by the wrongdoer is
equally grave in every case. Will there be an excuse for fraud if all victims
suffer an equal loss? Nobody would grant a private debtor the right to de-
cide its own debt relief as long as the haircut is equal and no creditor is
unfairly discriminated against. From an economic perspective, the unilateral
cessation of payment without a legitimate procedure to which the parties
have agreed ex ante is a question of reputational damage and its
consequences.122
This paper does not claim to provide a complete overview about pri-
vate ordering proposals for sovereign debt restructuring, but following is a
description of two proposals, both of which translate the economics of in-
solvency in private sector economy to the case of sovereign debt. The inten-
tion being to create a restructuring procedure that is able to efficiently
regulate debtor-creditor issues, and of similar importance, creditor-creditor
issues.
A Resolving Proceeding for Defaulting Sovereigns by Christoph
Paulus123 has further developed and transferred the proposals for a sover-
120. Design of the SDRM, supra note 108, at 58–70.
121. See, e.g., Kirchner & Ehmke, supra note 1; Christian Kirchner and David Ehmke,
Restrukturierung von Schulden sourvera¨ner Staaten aus Forderungen privater Gla¨ubiger: Zu
einer ku¨nftigen Rolle des Londoner Clubs, 112 ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSEN-
SCHAFT 438–70 (2013); Christoph Paulus, A Resolving Proceeding for Defaulting Sovereigns,
IILR 1 (2012) [hereinafter A Resolving Proceeding]; Christoph G. Paulus, A Standing Arbitral
Tribunal as a Procedural Solution for Sovereign Debt Restructurings, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WILL THIS TIME BE DIFFERENT? 317 (Carlos A. Primo Braga & Galli A.
Vincelette eds., 2010) [hereinafter A Standing Arbitral Tribunal].
122. See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2, III.B.4.
123. A Standing Arbitral Tribunal, supra note 121; A Resolving Proceeding, supra note 121.
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eign debt restructuring mechanism in public ordering to a private ordering
approach. Key features of the “resolvency proceedings” are a “Standing
Arbitral Tribunal” and the voluntary character of the proceeding. Debtor
and creditors predetermine their relations in bond and loan contracts so that
whatever limitations to the original claim occur ex post, the proceeding has
no coercive element other than clearly defined procedural rules for modifi-
cations of the debt contract to which the parties have agreed ex ante.
Christian Kirchner and David Ehmke have presented another private
ordering procedure.124 According to their proposal, the London Club should
be reformed and an informal forum for commercial bank lenders should be
developed to establish an institutional discussion for all private creditors in
response to the change in creditors’ structure. A core element of the re-
formed London Club proposal is the voluntary character of the contractual
agreement and the predetermined negotiation process in bond and loan
terms.
The contractual—or market—approach has certain advantages in con-
trast to a public procedure like the SDRM. Any feature of an efficient insol-
vency regime can be contractually agreed upon without the need for
subjecting nonconsenting creditors to a public procedure.125 Since changes
to the debt contracts are only possible with the creditors’ consent, legal
certainty is enhanced. Moreover, the procedure can be more quickly ad-
justed to changing circumstances and fashioned to respond to the individual
case.126 An efficient procedure can emerge from an institutional competi-
tion between different concepts to regulate debtor-creditor and creditor-
creditor relations in bond and loan contracts. A learning process should be
initiated.127
Some key bond clauses include a majority amendment clause, which
empowers a (qualified) majority to modify payment and non-payment terms
with binding effect for all creditors. In order to prevent strategic holdout
behavior between different creditor groups, all debt contracts are linked by
an aggregation clause so that the creditors can vote—maybe in classes—on
a single restructuring plan. The negotiation process is protected by clauses
that limit the options for individual action (e.g., by concentrating on legal
124. Kirchner & Ehmke, supra note 1; Kirchner & Ehmke, supra note 121.
125. Kirchner & Ehmke, supra note 1.
126. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation after the revolution: Foreign sovereign bond
contracts since 2003, 4 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 85 (2009). Gelpern and Gulati show developments in
sovereign debt contract design and suggest that different issuers offer different combinations of
bond contracts (i.e., that standardization is limited and different approaches compete on the
market).
127. For an empirical analysis of the shift from “unanimous action clauses,” which do not
allow for a binding majority decision, to “collective action clauses” in sovereign bond contracts,
see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation of Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Exami-
nation of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L. J. 929 (2004). For a test confirming the expectation that
creditors care about sovereign debt contracts, see Choi, Gulati, & Posner, supra note 45.
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entitlement for the exercise and enforcement of a right in a trustee). Which
law should be applicable to the debt contract, and whether and with which
powers an arbitral tribunal should decide a dispute, has to be contractually
agreed upon ex ante.128 Terms in bond and loan contracts perform another
important function in the avoidance of an unsustainable debt burden by cur-
tailing debtor’s misbehavior ex ante (e.g., by the introduction of a negative
pledge [competing paper] clause that restricts the debtor’s ability to offer
security for its debt and reduces the potential to acquire further debt). The
implementation of collective action clauses to regulate debtor-creditor and
creditor-creditor issues has received broad political support.129
V. OUTLOOK
A sovereign debt restructuring regime in either private or public order-
ing is a mainstay in the international financial architecture. It can not only
resolve inter-creditor conflicts, but facilitate debt restructuring negotiations.
A sovereign debt restructuring mechanism has to be designed in order to
curtail the sovereign debtor’s misbehavior. In the long-run interest of credi-
tors and sovereign debtors, the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism is
the superior alternative to a bailout in a transfer union as well as to a unilat-
eral and illegal cessation of payments.
First, sovereign indebtedness in a transfer union with a predictable
bailout is likely to entail tremendous moral hazard. A pooling equilibrium
permits the incentive for monitoring and the disciplinary and informative
function of interest rates to vanish.130 The weaker members of a transfer
union are virtually encouraged to accumulate cheap debt capital at the cost
of the stronger members, while the overall incentive to invest in a solid
budgetary policy (and if necessary, to tighten the belt) sharply decreases.
Second, sovereign debtors “on their own” that cannot make a credible
commitment as a debtor subject to a collective procedure in case of distress,
if not considered “risk free,” will have to bear the cost of their own antici-
pated opportunism. While strong debtors are still seen as safe havens for
investors, especially in times of uncertainty about where to find safe invest-
ment opportunities, weak debtors, such as developing countries, will suffer
the most from the missing keystone of a credible and predictable collective
restructuring procedure.131 The chance for weak debtors to escape enforce-
ment behind sovereign borders after an “illegal” and unilateral cessation of
128. See Kirchner & Ehmke, supra note 1.
129. Statement by the Eurogroup (Nov. 28, 2010); Report of the G-10 Working Group on
Contractual Clauses, BIS.ORG (Sept. 26, 2002), http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf; John B. Tay-
lor, Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs, Speech at the Institute for International
Economics: Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A US Perspective (Apr. 2, 2002).
130. See supra Sections III.A.3, III.B.3.
131. See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2, III.B. 4.
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payment will be priced into credit cost ex ante.132 An efficient restructuring
procedure, on the other hand, will decrease the cost of debt capital if the
procedure itself promises to lower the cost of factual insolvency. However,
debtor-friendly collective procedure that offers a cheap exit route is likely
to have the opposite effect. Beyond the effect of debtors’ anticipated behav-
ior on the cost of debt capital, the signaling effects of the sovereign debtor’s
behavior can be expected to have an impact on the sovereign’s credibility as
a “host country” for investments in its national economy (apart from sover-
eign debt lending). The sovereign debtor’s reputation should impact inves-
tors’ expectations about the sovereign’s behavior as a national lawmaker as
far as it affects legal certainty and therewith the risk of local investments.133
It can be concluded that the long-term costs and ex ante inefficiencies
of unilateral actions by sovereign debtors and bailouts outweigh any short-
term benefits of delayed default. A public and/or private ordering debt re-
structuring mechanism can illuminate a market-oriented exit route from dis-
orderly and costly attempts to cure the symptoms of distress. It can provide
an answer to the underlying problems of moral hazard in sovereign
indebtedness.
132. See supra Section III.B.4.
133. See supra Section III.B.2.
